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Abstract
In December 1997 the International Court of Justice issued an order, Jor the first time,
allowing a counter-claim. The Court found that the counter-claim submitted by Yugoslavia in
the case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide was admissible under Article 80 para. 1 of the Rules. This raised the
question whether a counter-claim may be presented in a case concerning the violation of an
erga omnes obligation. The nature of counter-claims and their admissibility are analysed in
this comment in relation to such cases. It Is argued that counter-claims should be admitted
before the Court only if built on defences on the merits and if strictly connected with the
merits of the case in which they are raised. The author concludes that these conditions for the
admissibility of a counter-claim cannot be fulfilled when the violation of an erga omnes
obligation is alleged. The defensive character cannot be maintained as the Respondent State
cannot invoke a previous violation of its rights committed by the Applicant in order to justify
conduct that infringes an erga omnes obligation. Furthermore, connection in fact and in law
is also lacking.
1 Introduction
The International Court of Justice has recently made two orders concerning the
admissibility of counter-claims. The first, dated 17 December 1997, was in the case
concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia); the second, dated 10 March
1998, was in the case on OH Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of
America).1
* Ph.D candidate, University of Milan, Italy.
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 For the texts of these cases see the Website of the ICJ, <http://www.icj-cij.org>. For a commentary see
Arcari, 'Domande riconvenrionall nel processo dl fronte alia Corte Inlemaztonale dl glustteia', 81 Rlvista
di dlriuo tnumnionale (1998) 1042: Bekker. 'International Decisions'. 92 AJJL (1998) 508.
European Journal of International law 9 (1998), 724-736
Counter-Clalms and Obligations Erga Omnes before the International Court of Justice 725
In both of these cases the Court found that the counter-claims, respectively
submitted by Yugoslavia and the United States in their counter-memorials, were
admissible under Article 80 para. 1 of the Rules of the ICJ, which reads as follows:
A counter-claim may be presented provided that It Is directly connected with the subject matter
of the claim of the other party and that It comes within the jurisdiction of the Court
The first of these counter-claims raises a new problem.
On 20 March 1993 the Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina had
filed an Application requesting the Court to declare that Yugoslavia had violated,
among other treaties, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide,2 to order Yugoslavia to cease such violations, and to declare that
Yugoslavia was responsible under international law for damages incurred by such
violations and should make reparation.3 In its counter-memorial Yugoslavia
submitted to the Court a counter-claim alleging violations of the Genocide Convention
on the part of the Government of Bosnia. Thus, for the first time a counter-claim has
been submitted to the Court in a case concerning a violation of erga omnes obligations.
The present comment will analyse the question of the nature of counter-claims and
their admissibility in relation to cases concerning the violation of this type of
obligation. The purpose is to ascertain whether under Article 80 of the Rules of the
Court the submission of counter-claims should be allowed when the claim concerns
violations of erga omnes obligations.*
2 The Nature of Counter-claims in the Court's Procedure
Counter-claims were admitted before the Permanent Court of International Justice
under Article 40 of the Rules of Procedure of 1922, which states:
Counter-Cases shall contain:
(1) the affirmation or contestation of the facts stated In the Case;
(2) a statement of additional facts. If any;
(3) a statement of law;
(4) conclusion based on the facts stated; these conclusions may include counterclaims, in so far as
the latter come within the furisdictlon of the Court,...'
It seems clear, from the travaux priparatolres of this text that the concept of
counter-claims envisaged by the proponents was a narrow one. Consistent with the
idea that cases had to be brought before the Court either by special agreement or by
application — as was required by Article 40 of the Statute — counter-claims could
Hereinafter the Genocide Convention.
On 11 July 1996 the Court decided on the preliminary objections concerning Its jurisdiction raised by
Yugoslavia, affirming its Jurisdiction solely on the basis of Article 9 of the Genocide Convention. See ICJ
Reports (1996). For a commentary see Hlppler Bello. 'International Decisions'. 91 AJK (1997) 121.
There Is thus no need to analyse here one of the requirements set by Article 80. namely jurisdiction of the
Court
Emphasis added.
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only exceptionally be submitted by the Respondent.6 Counter-claims had to be built on
defences on the merits and were required to be strictly connected with the cases in
which they were raised. The counter-claim was regarded as basically a defence, with
the addition of 'something more'.7
In the words of Anzilotti:
L'eTiment commun awe dtverses legislations qul accudllent la notion de la demand: rcconventlonndle
est que, par cette demande. It difendcur tend a obtenir en sa proprefavtur, dans le mime prods Intenti
par It denumdeur quelquc chose de plus que k re)et des prttenttons du demander, de plus, par
consequent, que I'qfflrmatlon juridlquc sur laqueUe se base le rejet Telle est, sans doute, la demande
reconventlonclle dont parle /'art. 40 du RiglemenL*
During the 1922 preliminary session Lord Finlay commented:
There might be une demande reconvenUonneUe which, though In form a demand, was really In
the nature of a defence to the proceedings. It might be so closely connected with It, that It would
be very wrong for the Court to take cognisance of the claim without taking cognisance of the
counter-claim.'
During discussions on the revision of the Rules in the 1934 session, Andlotti
pointed out the practical advantage of admitting the submission of counter-claims in
pending proceedings, in that 'it enabled the respondent to demand, in the course of the
same proceedings, what was due to him from the applicant for a reason already
pending', and observed that 'it was in fact possible that a counter-claim would be so
closely bound up with the defence that, if the respondent were bound to submit a special
application, there would be a danger of placing the latter in a difficult position'.10
In the same session the introduction of the criterion of direct connection with the
subject matter of the application was proposed.11 The proponents explained that the
intention was to make it clearer that counter-claims were admissible only when the
grounds for the respondent's action already constituted a defence to the main
proceedings; the words of Lord Finlay were quoted. A suggested definition was 'a claim
* See PC3J Series D. No. 2, add. 3. at 105 A seq.. and the comments by Anzlloal. 'La rfconveniione neila
procedura Intemazkmale', 8 Rlvtsta dl diritto Internationale (1929) 320; Genet 'Les demandes
reconventionnelles et la procedure de la Cour Pennanente de Justice Internationale'. 19 Revue de droll
International etde legislation comparie (1938) 160;Scernl, 'La procedure de la Cour Pennanente de Justice
Internationale', 65 RdC(m, 1938) 646.
7
 Anzilotti, supra note 6; Genet supra note 6. at 149; C de Vlsscher. Aspects ricents du droll procedural de la
Cow Internationale de Justice (1966). at 113.
* Anrilota. 'La demande reconvenUonnelle en procedure Internationale', 57 Journal de drolt International
(1930), at 8 5 7 rt seq. (French translation of the article 'La rlconvenrione nella procedura Internationale',
supra note 6). The common factor among the various legal systems that accept the notion of
counter-claim is that for this claim, the defendant seeks to obtain, in his own favour and in the same
action as brought by the claimant something more than rejection of the claimant's demands, and
therefore more than the legal statement on which rejection Is based. This Is presumably the
counter-claim mentioned in Article 40 of the Rules.'
' In POJ Series D, No. 2, add. 3. at 108.
10
 ttld, at 106. Emphasis added.
11
 Old. at 100.
Counier-Claims and Obligations Erga Omnes before the International Court of Justice 727
directly dependent on the facts of the main action'.12 As the defensive purpose was
considered insufficient, a strict connection with the principal claim was also required
in order to justify a joint treatment13 Thus, Article 63 of the Rules was adopted, and is
still in force (now as Article 80 of the 1978 Rules).
A narrow concept of counter-claims also emerges from the PCTps and the ICJ's
earlier decisions. All the admitted counter-claims had the purpose of countering the
principal claim; when pronouncing on their admissibility, the Court always
ascertained the existence of a connection with the principal claim.
In the Chondw Factory case (merits), the Permanent Court observed, with reference
to the Polish Government's counter-claim:
that the counter-claim Is based on Article 256 of the Versailles Treaty, which article is the basis of
the objection raised by the respondent, and that consequently. It Is juridically connected with the
principal claim As regards the relationship existing between the German claims and the
Polish submission In question, the Court thinks It well to add the following: Although In form a
counter-claim, since its object is to obtain ]udgement against the Applicant for the delivery of
certain things to the Respondent — in reality, having regard to the argument on which It Is
based, the submission constitutes an objection to German claim designed to obtain from Poland
indemnity the amount of which Is to be calculated, amongst other things, on the basis of the
damage suffered by the Oberschleslsche.1*
In the River Meuse case (Netherlands v. Belgium) the Court admitted the counter-
claim of the Belgian Government as the claim was 'directly connected with the
principal claim'.15 In response to the alleged breaches of the Treaty establishing the
regime for taking water from the Meuse between the Netherlands and Belgium, the
Belgian Government had alleged that the Netherlands had committed violations of the
same Treaty. It was submitted that, as a consequence of those violations, the
Netherlands had 'rendered the proper application of the Treaty impossible', and that
the Netherlands had lost its right to invoke the Treaty.
In the Asylum case (Colombia v. Peru) the question of admissibility of counter-claims
was extensively discussed. The Government of Colombia contested the admissibility of
Peru's counter-claim by arguing that it was not directly connected with the subject
matter of the Application. In its view, this lack of connection resulted from the fact
that the counter-claim raised 'new problems' and thus tended to 'shift the grounds of
the dispute'.16
12
 ttM, at 112.
11
 A distinction has been suggested between 'direct' counter-claims, namely those arising out of facts or
transactions upon which the principal claim Is based, and 'Indirect' counter-claims, namely those arising
out of facts or transactions different from those on which the principal claim Is based. The distinction was
present In the Draft convention on competence of courts In regard to foreign states, prepared by the
Research In International Law group of the Harvard Law School see 26 AJIL (1932) 490. It was also
made later by authors with reference to PCIJ's and ICJ's procedure. See Hudson, La Cour Permanent* de
Justice Internationale, Paris, 1936. at 500: Genet, supra note 6, at 164: Hambro, The Jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice1. 76 RdC(l, 1950). at 151-152: G. Guyomar, Commentairt au riglunent de
la Cour Internationale de Justice (1983) 521.
14
 PCTJ Series A, No. 17. at 38. Emphasis added.
15
 PCTJ Series A/B, No. 76. at 28.
16
 i q Reports (1950). at 280.
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The Court did not accept this view and stated:
It emerges clearly from the arguments of the Parties that the second submission of the
Government of Colombia, which concerns the demand for a safe-conduct, rests largely on the
alleged regularity of the asylum, which is precisely what is disputed by the counter-claim. The
connexion is so direct that certain conditions which are required to eiist before a safe-conduct
can be demanded depend precisely on facts which are raised by the counter-claim. The direct
connexion being thus clearly established, the sole objection to the admisslblllty of the
counter-claim In Its original form Is therefore removed.17
Therefore the connection was asserted on the ground that the counter-claim was
based on facts that, if ascertained, would have caused the rejection of the principal
claim.
The same appears even more clearly in the U.S. Nationals in Morocco case {French
Republic v. United States of America). With its counter-claim the Government of the
United States requested the Court to adjudge and declare that the facts alleged by the
French Government in its claim consisted in breaches of treaty rights of the United
States and represented violations of international law. In this case no objection to the
admissibility of the counter-claim was raised, and the Court proceeded to deal with all
the submissions, without expressly evaluating the existence of a connection.18
In the case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran
(Provisional Measures) the Court stated that
If the Iranian Government considers the alleged activities of the United States in Iran legally to
have a close connection with the subject-matter of the United States Application, It remains
open to that Government under the Court's Statute and Rules to present its own argument to
the Court regarding those activities either by way of defence in a Counter-Memorial or by way
of a counter-claim filed under Article 80 of the Rules of the Cour t"
Thus, these arguments are considered to be the possible basis of a defence and also
of a counter-claim.
In all of these cases, the defendant, by submitting a counter-claim, essentially aimed
at 'countering' the principal claim, reducing or neutralizing it, alleging a counter-debt
(Chorzdw Factory case), contending the existence of a fact alleged by the applicant in
its claim (Asylum case; U.S. Nationals in Morocco case), alleging termination of a treaty
(River Meuse case), and so forth. Moreover, the facts that were invoked as a defence
were at the basis of a claim. Counter-claims added something more to the defence
insofar as the defendant requested findings against the applicant on the grounds of the
facts alleged as defences. In each of these cases the Court admitted the counter-claim
after ascertaining that it was closely connected with the case already pending.
The same may also be said of the counter-claim raised by the Government of the
United States in the Oil Platforms case. On 2 November 1992 Iran filed an application
instituting proceedings against the United States in respect of the dispute arising out of
the attack and destruction of three offshore oil production complexes, owned by the
17
 Ibid, at 280-281. Emphasis added.
" IQ Reports (1952). at 178.
" Order of l5 December 1979. i q Reports (1979). at 15.
Counter-Claims and Obligations Erga Omnes before the International Court of Justice 729
National Iranian Oil Company, by several warships of the United States Navy in
October 1987 and April 1988. Iran alleged the violation of the bilateral Treaty of
Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights of 19 5 5. In its counter-memorial, the
Government of the United States set forth a counter-claim, alleging Iran's breaches of
the same Treaty, and justified the direct connection of the counter-claim with the
principal claim by stating:
the facts and circumstances that caused the United States to engage Iran's oil platforms —
Iranian attacks on, and threats to, merchant shipping, including US shipping and US nationals
— are at the heart of the US defence to Iran's claims ... these same facts and circumstances are
likewise the basis of the US counterclaim.10
In the order of 10 March 19 9 8, the Court took into consideration the circumstances
set out above by stating, inter alia, that 'the United States indicates, moreover, that it
Intends to rely on the same facts and circumstances in order both to refute the
allegations of Iran and to obtain judgements against that State'.21
These cases also show the 'dual character' of counter-claims. In the Order of 17
December 1997 concerning the Genocide Convention the Court stressed this feature
in the following terms:
it is established that a counter-claim has a dual character in relation to the claim of the other
party; whereas a counter-claim is Independent of the principal claim in so far as it constitutes a
separate 'claim', that is to say an autonomous legal act the object of which is to submit a new
claim to the Court, and whereas at the same time, it Is linked to the principal claim, in so far as,
formulated as a 'counter' claim, it reacts to It whereas the thrust of a counter-claim is thus to
widen the original sub)ect-matter of the dispute by pursuing objectives other than the mere
dismissal of the claim of the Applicant in the main proceedings — for example, that a finding be
made against the Applicant and whereas In this respect, the counter-claim is distinguishable
from a defence on the merits."
The Court then expressly observed that 'in Article 80 of its rules the Court did not
confer a different meaning on the expression "counter-claim" .. .'2J and went on to
stress the difference between mere defences and counter-claims,24 declaring inter alia
that 'the need to differentiate between counter-claims and defences in the scheme of
the Rules of Court is moreover sufficiently clear from the jurisprudence of the Court'.
The Court also referred to the passage quoted above from the United States Diplomatic
and Consular Staff in Teheran case.
Thus, in the interpretation set forth by the Court, counter-claims are not something
else, but something more, than a simple defence. For the counter-claim to be admissible
See para. 24 of the Order. Emphasis added.
Ibid, para. 38.
Para. 27 of the Order.
Ibid, para. 28.
For the distinction between 'exceptions reconventionneUes' and 'demandes reconventionnelies' see Scemi,
juprunote6, at 644—645; Genet supra note 6, at 147;de Visscher. supra note 7. For this distinction with
reference to set-off('cOTnpensaUon'): see the decision of 13 July 1995, C-341/93.ECR. 1-2053, of the Court
of Justice of the European Communities, concerning Interpretation of Art 6(3) of the 1968 Brussels
Convention; see. In particular, the conclusions of the Advocate General.
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the defensive purpose is not sufficient: as already observed, a direct connection
between the counter-claims and the principal claim is also required.
As the Court reaffirmed in the Order on the Genocide Convention, the purpose
(ratio) of admitting counter-claims is to achieve procedural economy, to ensure a
better administration of justice, to have an overview of the respective claims of the
parties in order to decide them more consistently, and to reach a just and coherent
final decision.25 A similar approach to counter-claims has been taken in international
arbitral tribunals.26 It is also widely used in internal legal systems.27
It is for this purpose that para. 1 of Article 80 requires counter-claims to be directly
connected with the subject-matter of the claim. Para. 3 of the same article states that:
In the event of doubt as to the connection between the question presented by way of
counter-claim and the subject-matter of the claim of the other party the Court shall, after
hearing the parties, decide whether or not the question thus presented shall be joined to the
original proceedings.28
Neither the text of Article 80 nor the travaux priparatoires provide us with a
definition of what is intended by 'direct connection'. Ascertaining a connection is left
to the discretion of the Court.29 In exercising its judicial discretion on the admissibility
of a counter-claim, the Court should undoubtedly follow the ratio described above.
In the two recent Orders on counter-claims the Court discussed the notion of 'direct
connection' under Article 80. In both Orders the Court declared that:
whereas the Rules of Court do not define what is meant by 'directly connected'.... It is In Its sole
discretion to assess whether the counter-claim Is sufficiently connected to the principal claim,
taking account of the particular aspects of each case . . . as a general rule, the degree of
connection between the claims must be assessed both in fact and In law.w
The Court considered that both counter-claims were directly connected with the
subject-matter of the principal claims as they rested on 'facts of the same nature',
formed part of the 'same factual complex', occurred in the same territory and in the
15
 See para. 30 of the Order. See also Genet, supra note 6. at 148.
26
 See Scelle, 'Arbitral Procedure', Yearbook of the TLC (19 50) 13 7; Larschan and Mlrfendereskl, The Status
of Counterclaims In International Law, With Particular Reference to International Arbitration Involving
a Private Party and a Foreign State', 15 Denver journal of intematlonalLawandPottcy (1986) 11: Rentlen,
'Encountering Counterclaims', 15 Denver journal of International Law and Policy (1986) 379.
" Legal systems may differ with regard to the degree of connection that Is required between the
counter-claim and the principal claim. However, the ground for admissibility (ratio) Is the same, namely
procedural economy and better administration of Justice. See Btomeyer, 'Judicial Remedies of the
Defendant', International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, VoL IV Civil Procedure, Ch. 4, at 63 et seq.\
Rentlen, supra note 26, at 380.
u
 This power has to be distinguished from the general power of Joinder of cases provided under Article 47 of
the Rules. As the precedents of the two Courts show, this power Is exercised only with the consent of
parties and only with reference to cases pending between the same parties and relating to the same
subject-matter, or parallel cases directed at the same object Introduced by several applicants against a
single respondent See S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court VoL II (1965), at 551;
Guyomar, supra note 13, at 300 et sea,.
n
 Anidlotti, supra note 8, at 870-871; Genet, supra note 6, at 165.
30
 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Counter-claim Order para. 33; Case concerning Oil Platforms. Counterclaim Order, para. 37.
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same period; furthermore, the two parties Intended to rely on certain identical facts in
order both to refute the allegations of the applicant state and to obtain judgment
against it, and pursued 'the same legal aim', namely the establishment of legal
responsibility for violations of the same treaty (respectively, the Genocide Convention
and the bilateral Treaty).31
3 Counter-claims and Erga Omnes Obligations
The distinction between obligations binding a state vis-d-vis another and obligations
which bind each state with respect to all others, and are thus owed to 'a community of
states' or to the 'international community as a whole' — erga omnes obligations — has
been widely accepted,32 and has indeed been recognized in the DX Draft Articles on
State Responsibility.33
The Court drew this distinction in its famous obiter dictum in the Barcelona Traction
case, stating:
an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the
International community as a whole, and those arising vis-a-vis another State In the field of
diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In view of
the Importance of the rights Involved, all States can be held to have a legal Interest In their
protection; they are obligations erga omnes.
Such obligations derive, for example. In contemporary International law, from the
outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules
concerning the basic rights of the human person, Including protection from slavery and racial
discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights of protection have entered Into the body of
general international law...; others are conferred by International Instruments of a universal
or quasi universal character."
As noted here by the Court, examples of erga omnes obligations may be found both in
general international law and in treaty law. There are arguably many areas of
concern to the international community, such as protection of human rights,
Ibid. para. 38 and paras. 34-35. respectively.
Morelli, 'A propostto di norme lntemarionali cogenti', 51 Rlvlsta di dlritlo Internazlonale (1968), at
114-115; Ga)a, 'Ius Cogens beyond the Vienna Convention', 172 RdC (m, 1981). at 280-281; Idem,
'Obligations Erga Omnes, International Crimes and jus Cogens: A Tentative Analysis of Three Related
Concepts', In J. H. H. Weiler, A. Cassese and M. Splnedl (eds), International Climes of States. A Critical
Analysis of the HC's Draft Article 19 on State Responsibility (1989), at 151; F. Lattaiui, Garamle del dlritii
dell'uomo nd dlritto Intenvnlonale generale (1983), at 125 et seq.; Annacker, The Legal Regime of Erga
Omnes Obligations In International Law', 46 Austrian Journal of Public and International Lav (1994), at
131 et seq.; A. de Hoogh, Obligations Erga Omnes and International Crimes (1996), at 49 et seq.; M. Ragad.
The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes (1997).
See Art. 40, paras 2(e)(il), (ill), (0 and 3. See also Arangio-Rulx, 'Fourth Report on State Responsibility
Add. 1-3'. Yearbook oftheHC, Vol. EL Part One (1992), at 34 et seq. and 43 et seq.
ICJ Reports (1970). at 32. For a brief survey of further decisions by the Court adopting the same concept,
see Thirtway, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice', 60 BYbH (1989). at 93 et
seq.; Annacker, supra note 32, at 132 et seq.
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peace-keeping, disarmament and arms control, and protection of the environment.33
One of the features of this type of obligation is their 'indivisibility',36 their
'non-bilateralizable structure',37 their non-reciprocal character: their violation affects
all other states (in case of obligations under general international law) or all other
states that are party to the treaty that imposes these obligations.
It is for this reason that countermeasures cannot consist in a violation of an erga
omnes obligation. When reacting to a breach of an obligation, the injured state cannot
adopt a conduct consisting in a breach of an erga omnes obligation because in so acting
it would injure also the rights of Innocent states.38 This legal structure is typical not
only of peremptory norms (jus cogens),™ but also of other norms of general
international law and of a number of multilateral treaties.40 This was accepted by the
Court in its Order on the Genocide Convention, when it stated:
Arangto-Ruiz, supra note 33, at 44; Lattanzi, supra note 32, at 126-127. In the field of environmental
law see Rcone, 'ObbUghl redproci ed erga omnes degli StaU nel campo della protezione lntemazionale
defl'amblente marlno'. In V. Starace (ed.), Dtritto Internationale e protezione dell'ambtente marino (198 3), at
32 et seq.; Sptaedi, 'Les consequences Jurtdlques d'un fait tntemauonalemment Ulldte causant un
dommage a l'envlronnement', In F. Frandonl and T. Scovazzl (eds), International Responsibility for
Environmental Harm (1991), at 88 et seq.
Lattami, supra note 32, at 125-126; Aranglo-Rulz, supra note 33, at 34.
Annacker, supra note 32, at 136.
Ga)a, 'hiscogens', supra note 32, at 297; Idem, 'Obligations Erga Omnes', supra note 32, at 156; Lattanzi,
supra note 32, at 314-315; Annacker, supra note 32, at 155 and 162.
Many authors refers to jus cogens as a limit for countermeasures: see, among others, Fltzmaurice,
'General Principles of International Law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law', 92 RdC (n,
1957)120: Slmma, 'Reflections on Article 60 of the Vienna Convention', 20 Osterrdchische Zdtschrififilr
Offentllches Recht (1970), at 12 and 15.
Arangto-Ruli, supra note 33, at 34. With reference to multilateral treaties see also Rlphagen's draft
Article 11, para.l(a) and (b), yearbook of the HC, VoL E, Part One (1985) 12. In the International Law
Commission, however, this view did not prevail and Article 50 of the Draft Articles on State
Responsibility, adopted In 1996, prohibits. Inter alia, countermeasures which consist In a 'conduct In
contravention of a peremptory norm of general International law'. Gaja, 'Obligations Erga Omnes', supra
note 32, at 156. note 18, had suggested a modification of the draft article 'In order to cover all erga omnes
obligations'. Similar considerations had led to the adoption of para. 5 of Article 60 of the Vienna
Convention on the law of Treaties, which concerns suspension and termination of treaties as a
consequence of Its breach. Fitzmaurice, In his 'Second Report on the Law of Treaties', Yearbook of the EC,
VoL H, Part One (1957), at 30 et seq, had suggested that a violation of treaty obligations 'which are of a
general public character requiring an absolute and Integral performance' could not Justify a suspension
In their performance by the other parties. The solution finally adopted by the ILC seems more restrictive:
Article 60 para. 5 of the Vienna Convention does not allow termination or suspension of the operation of
a treaty as a consequence of Its breach with regard to provisions relating to the protection of human
persons contained In treaties of a humanitarian character. However, one could observe that, during the
preparatory works, the prevailing opinion was that this exception to the rules on termination and
suspension of treaties with reference to humanitarian treaties was justified by their erga omnes character.
See Official Records of the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, First Session, Vienna, 26
March-24 May 1968, at 352 et seq. and Second Session, Vienna, 9 Apru-22 May 1969, at 111 el seq. On
this article see Barile, "The Protection of Human Rights In Art. 60, Paragraph 5 of the Vienna Convention
of the Law of Treaties', In International Law at the Time of Its Codification. Essays In Honour of Roberto Ago,
VoL D (1987); Slmma, supra note 39.
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Whereas Bosnia and Herzegovina was right to point to the erga omnes character of the
obligations flowing from the Genocide Convention, and Parties rightly recognised that in no
case could one breach of the Convention serve as an excuse for another . . . "
Therefore, in proceedings before the Court, the respondent state cannot invoke a
previous violation of its rights committed by the Applicant in order to justify its own
conduct that infringes an erga omnes obligation — not even if the previous violation
also concerned an erga omnes obligation.
4 The Order concerning the Genocide Convention
The main argument of the Government of Bosnia in objecting to the admissibility of
the counter-claim was that, due to the erga omnes character and the non-reciprocal
nature of the obligations embodied in the Genocide Convention, even if the allegation
set out in the counter-claim was founded, 'this could not in any way result in the total
or partial dismissal (or neutralization) of Bosnia and Herzegovina's original claim, nor
—of course—in "something more1".42 For the Government of Bosnia 'Yugoslavia's so
called "counter-claim" is not really one at all: in submitting its counter-claim the
other party does not counter the initial claim, but formulates a second, autonomous
dispute relating to facts, the settlement of which could in no way influence the
solution of the first dispute .. .'.43
It is interesting to note that Yugoslavia did not contend the requirement of the
defensive character of the counter-claim, but maintained that the facts alleged in its
counter-claim had also a defensive purpose as they were 'of crucial importance to
answer the question of attribution to the Respondent of acts alleged by the Applicant'
and 'served for a proper qualification of the acts alleged by the Applicant'.44 For the
Government of Yugoslavia, the alleged violations of the Genocide Convention by
Bosnia and Herzegovina against the Serbs operated also as a defence against the
accusations made in the principal claim because those acts 'strongly influenced the
attitude of Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina' and were 'very relevant for
deciding on whether the Serb people acted under the orders of the Yugoslav
authorities . . . or spontaneously to protect itself'.45
Thus, while both parties agreed that, due to the erga omnes character of the
obligations ensuing from the Genocide Convention, in no case could one breach
justify, or serve as an excuse for, another.4* Yugoslavia's argument indirectly leads to
the same result as Bosnia committed acts of genocide, the Serb population reacted
'spontaneously' 'to protect itself', and therefore the Government cannot be held
responsible.
The Court accepted this line of argument by affirming that submissions 3 to 6 of the
Counter-Memorial of Yugoslavia 'set out separate claims seeking relief beyond the
41
 Para. 35.
43
 See the Order on Genodde Convention, paras 1 2 - 1 3 .
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 &M,para.l4.
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 Old, paras 1 9 - 2 1 .
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 Bid, para. 2 0 .
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dismissal of the claims of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and . . . such claims constitute
"counter-claims" within the meaning of Article 80 of the Rules of Court'.47
However, it cannot be argued that the facts alleged by Yugoslavia in its
counter-claim directly serve to obtain partial or total rejection of the principal claim:
from a procedural point of view they are not a 'defence', a 'plea', ('exception',
'eccezione', 'Einrede'), but are only directed to 'infer' that people acted without any
order from the Government (they may be considered at least as 'presumptions'). Were
the facts found to be true, Yugoslavia's lack of responsibility would not necessarily
follow.
As the breaches allegedly committed by the Applicant cannot support the rejection
of its claim, the further claim cannot be qualified as a counter-claim. The Court seems
to have adopted here a very broad notion of 'defence'. But even if one admitted the
existence of the defensive character of Yugoslavia's counter-claim, further consider-
ations should have led the Court to find that the counter-claim was inadmissible.
As noted above, the exercise of discretion by the Court in ascertaining the existence
of connection should be guided by a consideration of whether joint treatment would
allow the Court to achieve procedural economy and a better administration of justice.
Judicial economy may justify a decision of both claims in the same proceedings in
those cases where the claims require an evaluation of the same facts, of the same
evidence, and so forth. A better administration of justice may also render the joint
treatment of claims acceptable when there is a risk that two separate solutions may be
incoherent, when the solution of one case affects the solution of the other, and so on.
Otherwise the delays which inevitably arise as a result of the admission of the
counter-claim would excessively penalize the Applicant
No doubt, the facts alleged in Yugoslavia's counter-claim are different from those
alleged in the principal claim: there were different agents, different victims, different
circumstances. A separate fact-finding process will be necessary, with separate
inquiries and separate evidence to be assessed. Yugoslavia's claim does not rest on the
facts alleged in the principal claim, nor can it in any way influence the decision of the
principal claim. Procedural economy would thus appear to be lacking; nor would the
solution of the counter-claim permit a more coherent final decision. The decision on
Yugoslavia's claim cannot in any way affect the decision on Bosnia-Herzegovina's.
The delay that will necessarily result from the discussion of Yugoslavia's claim cannot
be justified by the probability of a more 'coherent' or 'just' final decision.
Therefore, in cases concerning this type of obligation the purpose of the
admissibility of a counter-claim in pending proceedings seems to be non-existent. In
fact, there is no apparent reason for dealing with the two claims simultaneously, as
the decision on one does not affect the decision on the other.48
The Court inferred the existence of a connection in law from the circumstances that
the two Parties pursued 'the same legal aim', namely the establishment of legal
Old, para. 29. Emphasis added.
Similar considerations, tnter alia, brought Judge Weeramantry to vote against the Order on Genocide
Convention; see his Dissenting Opinion.
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responsibility for violations of the same treaty. In this regard a distinction should
however be drawn between bilateral and most multilateral treaties. The alleged
breaches of a bilateral treaty should properly be ascertained together. In this case the
ratio underlying the admissibility of counter-claims seems respected. The apparent
violation of a treaty obligation may be justified as a countermeasure. In fact, these
treaties are usually inspired by the principle of reciprocity. Moreover, a complete
evaluation of all the alleged violations of the same treaty in the same proceedings is to
be considered expedient both for procedural economy and for a better decision.49
Therefore, claims that are based on alleged violations of the same bilateral treaty may
be considered as legally connected. This occurred in the River Meuse case as well as in
the Oil Platforms case.
A completely different approach must be taken in relation to a multilateral treaty
which imposes erga omnes obligations, in particular those of a humanitarian
character: as already observed, these treaties are inconsistent with the principle of
reciprocity. As the Court stated, with reference to the Genocide Convention:
The Convention was manifestly adopted for a purely humanitarian and civilizing purpose....
In such a convention the contracting States do not have any Interest of their own; they merely
have, one and all, a common Interest, namely the accomplishment of those high purposes
which are the raison d'etre of the convention. Consequently, In a convention of this type one
cannot speak of Individual advantages or disadvantages to States, or of the maintenance of a
perfect contractual balance between rights and duties.50
Hence, the violation by each state is to be considered per se. There is no reason for a
simultaneous examination.51
5 Conclusion
None of the conditions for the admissibility of a counter-claim before the Court may be
found when the violation of an erga omnes obligation is alleged.
Moreover, when, as in the case concerning the Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, notwithstanding the erga omnes
character of the obligations, the Respondent submits a counter-claim and asserts its
defensive character, in order to guarantee effectiveness to this principle, there should
be a strict evaluation of the defensive purpose. Facts alleged should consist in a
'defence' aimed at obtaining the partial or total rejection of the principal claim.
In appraising the further requirement of a direct connection, the Court's discretion
should be guided by the ratio underlying the admission of counter-claims in the Court
proceedings: the facts alleged should be connected to those submitted by the
Applicant, in so far as they can lead to a better administration of justice, or to a
4
' In certain aspects this case may be considered comparable with counter-claims arising out of the same
contract as the principal claim, which are admissible in all legal systems.
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consistent final decision, without penalizing the Applicant through useless delays.
Connection in fact and in law seems to be lacking when the solution of one case does
not affect the solution of the other.
Comments on this article are invited on the EJIL's web site: <www.ejil.org>.
